A framework for system fingerprinting by Radhakrishnan, Sakthi Vignesh







of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in the
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
May 2013
Copyright c© 2013 by Sakthi Vignesh Radhakrishnan
A FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING
Approved by:
Dr. Raheem A Beyah
Advisor and Committee Chair
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. John Copeland
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Henry Owen
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: 27 March 2013
To my parents,
Radhakrishnan and Vijayakumari,
my family, and all my friends,
without whom none of my success would be possible.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the help and guidance of several individuals
who in one way or the other contributed to completion of this study.
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Ra-
heem A Beyah for his continuous support, patience, motivation, and enthusiasm throughout
my thesis. I feel deeply honored to have worked with someone who’s care and support ex-
tends beyond the boundaries of academics.
My sincere thanks also goes to Dr. Selcuk Uluagac who has been a great company
throughout my life at Georgia Tech. Without him, I would have missed out on so many
opportunities that I now relish. I can never thank him enough for his help and support all
through my thesis, especially before deadlines, and on sleepless nights.
Besides, I would like to thank my committee members, Prof. John Copeland and Prof.
Henry Owen for their helpful comments and support.
I also extend thanks to my lab buddies, Supreeth, Ram and Venkat for being such
an awesome company through all the ups and downs. Without the continuous music from
harman/kardon (must mention that its a loop of 10), ever improving sessions of table tennis,
tons of humor, breaking open computers, and the QR code, my life at Tech wouldn’t have
been anywhere close to what I have just experienced. My gratitude also extends to Sang
Shin, Troy, Aaron, Marco and Xiaojing for their continuous support and technical guidance.
I would also like to extend a special thanks to my friend Gopi Sundaresan who has offered
enormous help during all phases of my master’s.
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my entire family back in India, my teacher
Bhanu, and Subbarayan & family for their continuous support and encouragement. Not to
forget, a big hearty thanks to Anand, Priyadarshini, Raj and Priya for their immense love
and care during my days away from home.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Research Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 A Summary of Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Fingerprinting Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 GTID: A Technique for Physical Device and Device Type Finger-
printing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
II RELATED WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
III A FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Overview of the Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Monitoring Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 Identification Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.5 Decision Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV AN IDENTIFICATION SUBMODULE FOR DEVICE AND DEVICE
TYPE FINGERPRINTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 Overview of the Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.1 Components of the Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.2 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3.3 Metrics for GTID’s Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4 Performance Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
v
4.4.1 Setup of Testbeds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.4.2 Traffic & Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4.3 Experimental Results from Isolated Testbed - Wireless . . . . . . . 32
4.4.4 Experimental Results from Campus Network - Wireless . . . . . . . 33
4.4.5 Experimental Results from Campus Network - Wireline . . . . . . . 37
4.5 Attacker Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.6 Sub-module Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.6.2 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
V CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
APPENDIX A — DETAILED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS . . . . . . 47
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vi
LIST OF TABLES
1 Isolated Network Device Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Campus Network Device Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3 Traffic Types Used in Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4 Isolated Network Testbed (Passive Analysis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5 Campus Network - Wireless (Passive Analysis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6 Campus Network - Wireless (Active Analysis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7 Campus Network - Wireline (Passive Analysis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8 Campus Network - Wireline (Active Analysis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9 Timing analysis for variation in sample sizes : Traffic - UDP 1400byte 8Mbps
, Number of samples 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10 Effect of Parallelizing the Process : Sample Size 2500, Number of Samples 20 44
11 Device ID - Known Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive) . . . 47
12 Device Type - Known Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive) . . 47
13 Device ID - Unknown Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive) . . 48
14 Device Type - Unknown Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive) 48
15 Device ID - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive) . . . . 49
16 Device Type - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive) . . . 49
17 Device ID - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active) . . . . 50
18 Device Type - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive) . . . 50
19 Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive) . . . 51
20 Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive) . 51
21 Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active) . . . 52
22 Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active) . . 52
23 Device ID - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive) . . . . . 53
24 Device Type - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive) . . . . 53
25 Device ID - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active) . . . . . . 54
26 Device Type - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active) . . . . 54
27 Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive) . . . . 55
28 Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive) . . 55
vii
29 Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active) . . . . 56
30 Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active) . . . 56
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Overview of the Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Screen-shot of framework prototype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 Problem with 802.1x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Packet flow in hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5 PDFs of IATs for different CPU configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6 PDFs of IATs for different clock frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
7 Effect of clock skew on inter arrival times (IATs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8 Overview of GTID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9 Sample Neural Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10 CDF plot of closeness value for kindle fire - TCP traffic . . . . . . . . . . . 25
11 APL testbed setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12 Devices used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13 Campus testbed setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
14 Effect of Increasing Training Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
15 Recall vs Traffic Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
16 Recall vs Devices/DeviceTypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
17 Effect of MAC Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
18 PDF of UDP IATs for Normal and Attacker Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
19 PDF of Ping Response IATs for Normal and Attacker Traffic . . . . . . . . 39
20 O/S Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
21 Laptop Emulates a Kindle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
22 Real-Time Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
ix
SUMMARY
The primary objective of the proposed research is to develop a framework for smart
and robust fingerprinting of networked systems. Many fingerprinting techniques have been
proposed in the past, however most of these techniques are designed for a specific purpose,
such as Operating System (OS) fingerprinting, Access Point (AP) fingerprinting, etc. Such
standalone techniques often have limitations which render them dysfunctional in certain
scenarios or against certain counter measures. In order to overcome such limitations, we
propose a fingerprinting framework that can combine multiple fingerprinting techniques in
a smart manner, using a centralized decision making engine. We believe that any given
scenario or a counter measure is less likely to circumvent a group of diverse fingerprinting
techniques, which serves as the primary motivation behind the aforementioned method of
attack. Another major portion of the thesis concentrates on the design and development of
a device and device type fingerprinting sub-module (GTID) that has been integrated into
the proposed framework. This sub-module is designed using the core technique proposed
by the authors of [1]. The technique proposed in [1] involves the use of statistical analysis of
packet inter arrival times (IATs) to identify the type of device that is generating the traffic.
However, the work presented in [1] only provides a preliminary study of feasibility and is
limited to fingerprinting device types, and not devices. In this work, we analyze the perfor-
mance of the identification technique on a real campus network and propose modifications
that use pattern recognition neural networks to improve the overall performance. Addition-
ally, we impart new capabilities to the fingerprinting technique to enable the identification
of ’Unknown’ devices (i.e., devices for which no signature is stored), and also show that it




Cyber infrastructure has enabled major revolutions all over the world. We can now com-
municate, collaborate, and conduct business transactions with anyone in the world at any
time. Cyber space has quickly gone from being reserved for scientists (i.e., ARPANET) to
something that is critical to enabling basic functions in everyday life (e.g., vehicle naviga-
tion, banking, commerce). Cyber space is not just expanding, but in fact is getting more
dense with the introduction of smart phones and tablets. With BYODs (Bring Your Own
Devices) becoming the norms at campuses and corporates, the number of active devices
on local area networks and the Internet has grown exponentially. Given the increasingly
critical nature of cyberspace, it is imperative that it is secured.
One of the most significant threats to today’s computer networks is the threat from
insiders [2]. Insider attacks are dangerous because they subvert the traditional defense
mechanisms and are initiated “behind” them. Further, they are initiated by individuals
who have valid credentials to access the network and systems. In a recent National Security
Survey [3] it was pointed out that forty percent of all incidents reported by the 7,818
respondents (representing 36,000 US businesses) were attributed to insiders. Further, nearly
seventy-five percent of all cyber theft was attributed to insiders. Insider attacks can take
on many meanings, but they can be broadly classified as: 1) Malfeasors - Insiders that do
not have malicious intent and can unknowingly bring harm to an institution (e.g., a young
private connecting a video game system to a military network) or 2) False Insider - An
individual who is strategically planted inside of an institution (or planted devices) in order
to cause harm to the institution.
Given that traditional perimeter defense mechanisms (e.g., firewalls, signature- and
anomaly-based NIDS) are not effective against insider attacks, many institutions, have
begun to invest in technologies that have the ability to detect insiders. Network Access
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Control (NAC) is one of the popular approaches used by many organizations to prevent un-
authorized access to their network. In general, such a system consists of a NAC clients that
uses port-based authentication (802.1x) in conjunction with a backend authorization server
(e.g., RADIUS server). While such a solution can provide reasonable security when clients
are installed on the device it is to protect, it has limited to no support for other networked
devices (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) phones [4]). Moreover, with the move towards an
Internet of things and with a constantly evolving threat landscape, it is unlikely that vendors
will develop and support NAC clients for dozens of architectures and OS variants.
This lack of support for architecture and OS diversity can be seen today, with popular
vendors NAC solutions (e.g., McAfee, Symantec, Cisco) only fully supporting Windows and
just recently Mac and Linux OSs. A point of attack for a skilled attacker is to insert a device
that appears to be a printer (or any other unmanageable device) on the network. This threat
is especially heightened when we consider that insiders have the correct credentials to access
the network. Thus, in addition to defending against malicious processes or components of
known trusted devices with NAC clients, a solution is needed to ensure that rogue devices
cannot be inserted into the network (posing as unmanageable nodes), even if the insertion
is executed by an insider who possesses the proper network credentials.
1.1 Research Objective
The objective of this thesis is to 1) develop a modular fingerprinting framework that can
be used to integrate a wide variety of fingerprinting techniques such as OS fingerprinting,
device fingerprinting, etc.; 2) analyze in detail and improve an existing device fingerprinting
technique; 3) implement this technique as a deployable module (GTID) and integrate it into
the framework, along with existing techniques such as OS fingerprinting, etc.
The general trend with the works published in the area of fingerprinting is that, they
are all stand alone techniques designed specifically for a single type of fingerprinting (e.g.,
OS fingerprinting). Such standalone techniques have some limitations which render them
less useful in one or more scenarios. This research is novel in that it presents a finger-
printing framework that can be used to combine a variety of such standalone fingerprinting
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techniques to improve the overall robustness and performance of system fingerprinting.
In addition to this, the thesis proposes a device and device type identification technique
(GTID) with significant analysis and improvements to address the limitations of an existing
technique described in [1].
1.2 A Summary of Contributions
This thesis is an encapsulation of two major contributions. The first contribution is the
development of a deployable framework for system fingerprinting and the second contribu-
tion is GTID, a technique for device and device type fingerprinting. These contributions
are explained below.
1.2.1 Fingerprinting Framework
The framework’s design focuses on ways to combine multiple fingerprinting techniques such
that the overall strength is greater than the cumulative strengths of the standalone tech-
niques. The proposed framework has three major modules. The first module is called the
Monitoring-Module, which consists of tools that aid in the process of setting up network
interfaces cards and capturing network packets. The framework currently supports Wifi
and Ethernet interfaces, however the framework is modular and can be extended to support
other interfaces such as Universal Serial Bus (USB), Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) and more. The Identification-Module houses a list of identification sub-modules
that can work independently and feed results to the next stage. These sub-modules use the
monitoring tools provided in the Monitoring-Module to sniff packets or to send out specially
crafted traffic to the target system. At present, three sub-modules have been implemented
in the Identification-Module. The first is OS fingerprinting, which uses Nmap [5] as the
underlying program. The second sub-module is GTID, which has been implemented from
scratch. This sub-module will serve the purpose of fingerprinting devices and device types.
MAC-lookup is another simple sub-module that has been implemented. This uses IEEE’s
OUI List [6] in addition to a XML database to map MAC address to hosts/make. The third
and final module is the Decision-Module which will collect and processes the results fed in
by the Identification-Module. Using the stored results, the decision module will be able to
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send useful feedback to the identification tools. For example, OS results from the Nmap
sub-module can be sent as feedback to GTID, which can then wisely select a subset of the
available signatures. This will in turn help in reducing the number of false positives. This
framework also provides a graphical user interface that can be used to select target hosts,
apply identification techniques and to present results.
1.2.2 GTID: A Technique for Physical Device and Device Type Fingerprinting
GTID is a technique for device and device type fingerprinting. This work was motivated
by [1], which uses information leaked by the physical implementation of a device through
its network traffic to identify a device and a device’s type. This technique relies on the
use of statistical analysis to measure time-variant behavior in traffic and to create unique,
reproducible device and device type signatures. However, the work presented in [1] has the
following limitations that we address through this contribution.
Limitations:
1) The work presented in [1] only provides a preliminary study of feasibility and does not
perform extensive analysis on real networks. Such analysis is important given the fact that
inter arrival times (IATs) can be easily affected by both, physical and MAC layer contention.
2) Their proposed technique provided average results when used to analyze traffic on a real
network. This has been improved using a new technique that involves the use of pattern
recognition neural networks.
3) The original technique does not have the capability to identify unknown devices/types
(i.e., devices/types for which no signature exists in the master database). This has been
made possible through this work.
4) The authors of [1] focus only on wireless networks, however this work extends the analysis
to wired networks.
In addition to the above contributions, this work also looks into the effect of clock
skews on network traffic, possible counter measures to the proposed technique and into
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a deployable implementation that can be integrated into the Identification-Module of the
proposed framework. The primary weakness of this technique, as with most works that rely
on fine-grained packet timing, is that the timing is lost as a result of buffering in switches
and routers. Therefore, this technique is not suited for identification across the Internet.
Rather, it is perfectly suitable for the significant challenge of local network access control.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. In, Chapter 2 the related works are
presented followed by a description of the framework in Chapter 3. GTID is discussed in




The existing work in this area can be placed into four broad categories, namely, OS finger-
printing, device type fingerprinting, physical device fingerprinting and application finger-
printing.
The work in the category of OS fingerprinting, differentiates different OSs based on
different features of the protocol stack. Nmap [5] and Xprobe [7, 8] are active fingerprinting
tools that create special test packets to determine which OS is being used by the target. In
contrast to the aforementioned active approaches, p0f [9] uses TCP/IP protocol information
to passively determine the OS. SinFP [10] is an active and passive OS fingerprinting tech-
nique that bypasses some of the emerging limitations of Nmap (i.e., working with PAT/NAT
configurations and emerging packet normalization technologies). Such techniques can be
used by an adversary to launch OS specific attacks on target systems or can be used for
automating security tests in industries that use Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems [11]. However OS fingerprinting techniques do have their own limitation.
The authors of [12] claim that there are four major factors that significantly limit the use-
fulness of automated OS fingerprinting techniques. First, is over fitting of fingerprints to
non-OS-specific behavioral differences; second, is in-distinguishability of different OS vari-
ants; the third, is biasing of an automatic tool to the makeup of the training data; and the
fourth, is lack of ability for an automatic tool to exploit protocol and software semantics.
In addition to having natural limitations, OS fingerprinting techniques can also be evaded
using counter measures like the ones discussed in [13, 14]. Although the methods described
above are quite effective for OS fingerprinting, the goal of the GTID sub-module is to dif-
ferentiate device hardware and device types. Also, since our framework combines GTID
and OS fingerprinting, it has the combined advantage of both techniques which renders it
useful for both OS and device hardware fingerprinting.
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The second category of fingerprinting is host or physical device fingerprinting. Seminal
work in this area was introduced by Kohno et al. in [15]. In [15], a method for remotely fin-
gerprinting a physical device by exploiting the implementation of the TCP protocol stack
was proposed. The authors use the TCP timestamp option of outgoing TCP packets to
reveal information about the sender’s internal clock. The authors’ technique exploits mi-
croscopic deviations in the clock skews to derive a clock cycle pattern as the identity for a
device. The authors of [16] take a similar approach of that in [15] (i.e., using clock skew
to uniquely identify nodes), however the goal of [16] is to uniquely fingerprint APs. Also,
instead of getting the timestamp from TCP packets, they obtain the timestamp from 802.11
beacon frames. Because of the use of the 802.11 beacons, this approach only works for AP
fingerprinting, whereas GTID is capable of working for general devices such as laptops,
tablets and cell phones. There have also been physical layer approaches to fingerprint wire-
less devices. Radio frequency (RF) emitter fingerprinting uses the distinct electromagnetic
(EM) characteristics that arise from differences in circuit topology and manufacturing tol-
erances. This approach has a history of use in cellular systems and has more recently been
applied to Wi-Fi [17] and Bluetooth [18] emitters. The EM properties fingerprint the unique
transmitter of a signal and differs from emitter to emitter. Such techniques require expen-
sive signal analyzer hardware to be within RF range of the target. In contrast, GTID, and
thus our framework, requires only a network tap at a switch to capture traffic on a wired seg-
ment that could be a hop downstream. Moreover, GTID fingerprints devices independent of
the protocol and does not require deep packet inspection (e.g., timestamps). In contrast to
[15], the GTID sub-module is better positioned for scalability, does not compromise privacy
and works on IP level encrypted streams. In general, a major difference between the works
in this category and GTID is that the techniques presented here only fingerprint devices,
not both devices and device types. Also, the proposed technique will be able to classify a
previously unseen device to be Unknown, which is an unique feature not present it other
techniques discussed above. Given that GTID is a sub-module of the proposed framework,
it too shares the above advantages in addition to being able to fingerprint OSs, etc.
Another body of work that is very important is device type fingerprinting. The main
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objective of the techniques in this category is to be able to remotely identify a specific device
type. In [19], the authors fingerprint wireless AP types by probing them with various regular
and malformed packets. Along similar lines, the work discussed in [20], introduces a device
fingerprinting technique that can detect the type of wireless AP that a traffic stream passes
through. It relies on distinct patterns (from the hardware composition of the device) that
are generated in the network traffic as a result of specially crafted data streams. Wavelets
were used to extract the signatures of the device types from the data stream. Both of these
are active techniques and have the limitation that they can only fingerprinting wireless AP
types. The authors in [21] use timing information between commands and responses on
the Universal Serial Bus (USB) to distinguish between variations in model identifiers, OSs
(and sometimes OS version number), and whether a machine is answering from a real or
virtual environment. The obvious limitation of this work is that it requires one to be in
physical possession of the device. The authors of [22] propose a technique for device type
behavioral and temporal fingerprinting. They model a specific protocol implementation (i.e.,
the Session Initiation Protocol - SIP) and create a behavioral fingerprint using a Temporal
Random Parameterized Tree Extended Finite State Machine (TRFSM). Their technique
can learn distinctive timing patterns of the transitions in the SIP protocol’s state machine.
These timing patterns for the state machine can be detected by observing the difference
between various outgoing and incoming SIP messages of the device being fingerprinted.
In their early work [23], their technique required knowledge of the entire syntax of the
protocol. However, in [22] this requirement is relaxed as they only need a corpus containing
SIP sessions. The authors of [22, 23] develop a real-time approach and discuss deploying
their techniques in [24]. The disadvantage of this technique is that it is limited to a specific
application layer protocol - SIP (similar to the limitations of [15, 16]). The technique
proposed in [1] uses the differences in the statistical characteristics of inter arrival times of
the packets to identify the type of device that is generating the traffic. Such an approach was
shown [1] to overcome some of the limitations faced by other techniques in this category
of fingerprinting. Moreover, this technique has also been shown to work across different
traffic types, which means it is not protocol dependent akin to the techniques proposed in
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[15, 16, 25]. Finally, due to the nature of the core feature that is used, this technique is able
to work across a variety of device types, and is not limited to a specific type of device, which
is the case in [19, 20]. In general, a major difference between the work in this category and
the GTID sub-module is that the techniques presented here only fingerprint device types,
not both devices and device types. Moreover, GTID also address some of the limitations
of the work presented in [1]. A detailed explanation of the drawbacks and our method of
attack is explained in Chapter 4. Since, GTID is a part of the proposed framework, the
framework will be able to fingerprint both physical devices and device types in addition to
fingerprinting OSs, etc.
The next class of fingerprinting deals with the identification of application traffic. The
techniques proposed here can be further sub-classified as session-based, content-based and
constraint-based techniques. The session-based and content-based methods require prepa-
ration and training before the technique can be made ready to use. In addition to that,
the signature details need to be updated as and when the protocol or application behavior
changes. Well known port matching can be seen as a simple example of a session-based
traffic identification technique. Here the traffic of interest will be mapped to an application
based on the details provided in [26]. More advanced techniques in this area are discussed in
[27, 28]. The content-based techniques try to identify payload contents that are static and
unique for a given application. This is then used as a signature to classify unknown traffic.
The problem with such an approach is that it may fail with payloads that are encrypted
or when the application undergoes a version update. The constraint-based traffic identifi-
cation method can be seen as a subclass of session-based techniques. The major difference
of the constraint-based methods is that they do not require any application-level protocol
information. These methods use statistical techniques such as statistical signatures [29] or
supervised machine learning [30] to map traffic into a specific set of predetermined clusters.
These clusters are usually formed by applying constraints on traffic characteristics such as
flow duration, average packet size of a flow, packet inter arrival time and more. Clearly,
this category of work is orthogonal to the sub-module GTID which focuses on fingerprinting
physical devices and device types. However, these techniques can still be very useful for
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fingerprinting networked systems and might be integrated as a part of our framework in the
future.
Almost all the fingerprinting techniques that we have discussed above are standalone
techniques and this has been the general trend with the works published in this area of
research. The framework for system fingerprinting in general and the design ideas on in-
tegrating multiple standalone fingerprinting techniques, are novel, and to the best of our
knowledge there is no prior work that has addressed these specifically. Further, our de-
vice and device type identification sub-module (GTID) overcomes several aforementioned
limitations of existing device / device type fingerprinting techniques.
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CHAPTER III
A FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEM FINGERPRINTING
The proposed framework is discussed in this chapter with insights into the motivation behind
this contribution and scenarios where such a framework can be useful.
3.1 Motivation
As discussed in Section 2, most of the works published in this area of research have concen-
trated in the development of standalone techniques. The design goals of such techniques are
focused primarily on a single type of fingerprinting (e.g., device fingerprinting). While such
an approach is good for serving the needs of a particular application, it cannot be used for
broader needs such as fingerprinting networked systems. For example, an OS fingerprinting
technique provides very little or no information related to a system’s hardware. Also, each
technique has one or more limitations that renders them less useful in certain scenarios.
For example, the RF-based device fingerprinting technique requires the target system to be
in wireless range of the detection device. This is not always possible, and in such cases one
could use alternate techniques proposed in [15] to fingerprint devices. In addition to this,
the targeted system can also use some form of counter measures to evade a fingerprinting
technique. As an example, a simple MAC lookup technique can be easily evaded by an
attacker who spoofs the MAC address of his network interface card. However, it is very
unlikely that a given scenario or a counter measure will evade a group of fingerprinting
techniques, each of which uses a different detection algorithm. This serves as the primary
motivation for developing a fingerprinting framework that can integrate multiple standalone
techniques in a manner, where the overall strength is greater than the cumulative strengths
of individual techniques.
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Figure 1: Overview of the Framework
3.2 Overview of the Framework
As mentioned earlier, the central objective of this framework is to enable the integration of
various fingerprinting techniques that are available now and also those that will be available
in the future. To achieve this, the framework has been modularized into three segments:
the Monitoring-Module, the Identification-Module and the Decision-Module. An overview
of the framework is shown in Figure 1. The solid boxes in Figure 1 refer to modules that
have been currently integrated, and those in dotted boxes show possible extensions. The
following sections discuss in detail each of these modules and the components that have
been currently integrated into the framework.
3.3 Monitoring Module
The Monitoring-Module performs two primary tasks. The first task is to monitor network
traffic in one of the supported interfaces and the second is to generate and send out spe-
cially crafted packets. This may include packets with abnormal flags, SYN packets, etc.
Tcpdump [31] is currently integrated into this module to enable the monitoring of traffic
from within the framework. Tcpdump is a popular packet analyzer that can be used to
intercept and capture packets on interfaces such as that for Ethernet. The next tool that is
integrated into this module is Nmap [5]. Nmap is a popular open source OS fingerprinting
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tool used for network exploration and hacking. It is capable of both probing as well as
fingerprinting, however the probing capabilities of Nmap are most relevant to this module.
In addition to housing techniques for monitoring and probing, this module also brings
with it tools that are required to set up the network interfaces. As shown in Figure 1, this
is the only module that is in direct contact with the network interfaces. One such tool
that is currently integrated into this module is Airmon-ng [32]. This tool aids in setting up
virtual interfaces and in configuring wireless NICs to monitor traffic in promiscuous mode.
This brings us to the list of interfaces that are currently supported by this framework. As
shown in Figure 1, the framework currently supports Ethernet and Wifi interfaces. However
this can be extended in the future to include Universal Serial Bus (USB), Software Defined
Radios, bluetooth, etc. Such an expansion will also aid identification techniques such as
[21] and [17] respectively.
3.4 Identification Module
The Identification-Module is the heart of this framework. This module is responsible for
performing different types of fingerprinting and houses a number of identification techniques.
Currently, three such techniques have been integrated into this module. The first is GTID,
a tool that was developed as a part of this thesis. This tool is capable of both device
and device type identification. It uses trained neural networks to recognize previously seen
timing patterns in network flows, to identify both the device and the device’s type. A more
detailed explanation and analysis of this tool can be found in Chapter 4. The next tool is a
simple MAC look up module, which was also developed as a part of this work. It uses IEEE’s
OUI list [6] to map a particular MAC address to a company or make. This sub-module
also has a simple XML database which can be used to store known MAC addresses and
information related to it. The tool queries both places, with higher priority on the custom
built XML database. The third and final sub-module that is currently supported is OS
Fingerprinting. This sub-module uses Nmap [5] as the underlying program to fingerprint
OSs. It has its own database of signatures that it uses to match the OS of the target
host. As observed from the above discussion, each fingerprinting sub-module is completely
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independent from one another, and uses different techniques and separate databases. One
of the main objectives of the framework is to derive a way to integrate such stand-alone
modules in a way that they can work hand-in-hand. The way this is done is by using a
centralized Decision-Engine which is briefed in the next section.
3.5 Decision Module
This module aids in combining techniques that are available in the Identification-Module
in a way that helps them work together. It houses a centralized database that holds the
results obtained from each of the ID techniques. These results are properly categorized
and mapped to their respective technique. For example, MAC look up and GTID give out
the results for device ID. In this case both of these results are categorized under device ID
and each of them will be mapped to the respective technique. This helps in implementing
weights which represent how dependable the results are from a particular technique. The
GUI provides users control over the weights which are customizable. As an alternative,
one may chose a network scenario, from a list, which auto configures the weights according
to the selected scenario. For example, if the user is very sure about the integrity of the
network, he or she can set a high weight for MAC lookup (using the customize option) or
use a network scenario from the provided list that closely reflects the network’s climate.
As shown in Figure 1, the decision engine has a feed back path that is used for conveying
information back to the Identification-Module. Using this, the decision engine will be able
to send back information that aids in the trimming of master databases used by the identi-
fication sub-modules. For example, when one applies OS fingerprinting on a specific target,
the decision engine caches this information. Now, when GTID is invoked, the decision en-
gine passes the OS information to GTID, which will then be able to cherry pick the list of
masters signatures that run that specific OS. This has two major advantages. First, it helps
in improving the accuracy of the identification techniques (the smaller the number of master
signatures, the smaller the probability of false positives). Second, it helps in reducing the
identification times of the techniques (the smaller the number of masters signatures, the
smaller the processing time). Currently, this feature has been incorporated into GTID and
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Figure 2: Screen-shot of framework prototype
will be extended to other techniques. The decision engine also interfaces with the GUI to
display the final results in a very concise manner. It uses the provided weight and confi-
dence measure of the result to compute the overall confidence of the output generated by
a particular identification technique. For example, if the user assigns a weight of 60% to
GTID and if GTID produces a result with 80% confidence, then the overall confidence of
that particular outcome or result is measured as the product of the two confidence values,
which is 48%. Finally, the Decision-Module uses these confidence measures to display the
results for each system parameter (such as OS, ID, Type, etc.).
Figure 2 shows a screen-shot of the framework prototype that was developed. The way
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this operates is as follows. At first, the user types in the network address that is to be
scanned in the input box (marked 1). Then the user clicks “Scan Network” (marked 2)
which tabulates the list of devices (marked 3) that are up in the scanned network. The user
can now select a target system from the list shown under “Scan Results” (marked 3) and
apply any of the available ID techniques (marked 4). When an ID technique is selected, the
tool displays related options on the right (marked 5). The screen-shot in Figure 2 shows the
options that are available for GTID sub-module, which includes a slide-bar for setting the
confidence level. After setting up the ID technique, the user clicks “Apply ID” (marked 6)
which gives out the ID result under “Decision Outputs”. The screen-shot in this case shows
OS Fingerprinting and MAC Lookup applied on three targets, and GTID applied on the
first target alone. The outcomes listed under “Decision Outputs” (marked 7) are concise
results generated by the decision algorithm. To view detailed results about a specific target,
the user clicks the target under “Decision Outputs” (marked 7) and this generates a more
elaborate result under “Device Details” (marked 8).
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CHAPTER IV
AN IDENTIFICATION SUBMODULE FOR DEVICE AND DEVICE
TYPE FINGERPRINTING
4.1 Motivation
An important requirement in managing a network is to be able to identify the nodes that
are connected or attempting to connect. This is required to implement NACs that authen-
ticate devices using software clients, login credentials or rely on innate characteristics for
identification. The problem with using such techniques are 1) software clients - it cannot
be installed on all devices (e.g. embedded devices such as IP-Cameras or Sensor Nodes); 2)
login credentials - authenticates only the users and not devices, which is not secure (Fig-
ure 3); 3) innate characteristics - these parameters can be easily faked (e.g. spoofing of IP
Address or MAC Address). To overcome some of these limitations, the authors of [1] pro-
posed a technique to fingerprint device types using statistical analysis on the inter packet
arrival (IAT) times. Such an approach is passive (does not require a client software) and is
difficult to fake. However in order for the technique to be used for access-control it needs
to be able to identify devices and not just the types. Moreover, the work presented in [1]
only provides a preliminary study of feasibility and does not perform extensive analysis on
real networks. Such analysis are important given the fact that IATs can be easily affected
by both, physical and MAC layer contention.
The work presented in this chapter address the above issues through extensive analy-
sis of the technique on a real campus network. During the initial phase of this analysis,
it was found that the technique proposed in [1] did not perform well under real network
conditions. Thus, a number of other processing techniques in the area of signal process-
ing, machine learning and pattern recognition were evaluated. This analysis revealed the
suitability of pattern recognition neural networks, which shows acceptable levels of perfor-
mance for both device and device type identification. The experimental results obtained
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Figure 3: Problem with 802.1x
using neural networks show a significant improvement over the original technique. More-
over, for a detection technique to be of practical use, it needs to be quick and accurate.
High accuracy with high latency may lead to correct, but less useful results. In order to
study the detection speed of this technique, a prototype version of GTID was developed in
MATLAB and its performance was tested.
4.2 Background
Figure 4: Packet flow in hardware
Device packet creation is a complex process. This process involves many internal parts
of the node working together. Before a packet can be sent, the instruction set that initiates
the process must be extracted from the memory hierarchy (LI/L2 cache, main memory,
hard disk) and sent to the CPU for execution. The OS then directs the CPU to create a
buffer descriptor in main memory, which contains the starting memory address and length of
the packet that is to be sent. Multiple buffer descriptors are created if the packet consists
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of multiple dis-contiguous regions of memory. The OS then directs the CPU to write
information about the new buffer descriptors to a memory-mapped register on the network
interface card (NIC). These data traverse the front side bus through the Northbridge to
the PCI bus. The NIC initiates one or more direct memory access (DMA) transfer(s) to
retrieve the descriptors. Then, the NIC initiates one or more DMA transfer(s) to move
the actual packet data from the main memory into NIC’s transmit buffer using the address
and length information in the buffer descriptors. These data again leave the front side bus,
and travel to the NIC through the Northbridge and the PCI bus. Finally, the NIC informs
the OS and CPU that the descriptor has been processed. Then, the NIC sends the packet
out onto the network through its medium access control (MAC) unit [33]. A diagramatic
representation of this is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 5: PDFs of IATs for different CPU configurations
Assuming that the effect of the OS can be abstracted, one can see that the major
components that affect the creation of packets are: the CPU, L1/L2 cache, physical memory,
the direct memory access (DMA) controller, the front side bus, the back side bus, the
PCI bus, and the NIC. The opportunities for diversity are both at the device level and
at the component level. At the device level, different vendors use different components
with different capabilities and algorithms (e.g., Dell Latitude 2110 with Intel Atom N470
processor @ 1.83GHz vs. Lenovo G570 with Intel Core i5-2430 processor @ 2.4GHz) to
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create a device’s internal architecture. Accordingly, the packet creation process varies across
architectures aiding device type identification. The author of [34] has studied the variation
in IAT patterns for different CPU configurations and clock frequencies, the results of which
are presented in Figure 5 and 6. Figure 5 shows the difference in the IAT patterns for
two cache configurations (cache-config 1: data cache size 4KB, instruction cache uses LRU
replacement algorithm; cache-config 2: data cache size 8KB, instruction cache uses Random
replacement algorithm), and Figure 6 shows the result for two different clock frequencies.
These experiments clearly demonstrate the impact of hardware configuration on packet
IATs.
Figure 6: PDFs of IATs for different clock frequencies
Moreover, microscopic differences in the clock frequencies (clock skews) also contribute
to the differences in the timing pattern. For example, assume Asus netbooks take x CPU
cycles to sleep for 10ms and generate a 56 byte ping packet, and f1 and f2 are the clock
frequencies of two Asus netbooks, then the difference in the time taken to generate a packet
is x(f2 − f1)/(f1f2). This value will be reflected as average differences in the inter arrival
times (IATs) between two devices. Figure 7 shows a plot of average IAT values, of 5 identical
Asus netbooks generating 56 byte ping packets at 10ms intevals. The x-axis denotes the
sample numbers, where each sample consists of 2.5K ping packets. For instance, 20 samples
will have 50K ping packets in total. The average IAT of packets in each sample is shown
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on the y-axis. A clear difference in the average IATs of each of the 5 Asus netbooks can be
noted, even though they all belong to the same type. These minor variations in the average
IATs can affect the frequency count, which in-turn will result in different signatures for each
device. These two are among several possible reasons which enables device identification.
Figure 7: Effect of clock skew on inter arrival times (IATs)
4.3 Overview of the Technique
This section introduces the major components of GTID and discuss the algorithm used to
identify devices and their types. Further, it articulates the technical methods that were
used in evaluating the overall performance of the technique.
4.3.1 Components of the Technique
In this setup, a wireless device transmits data over the air to an AP. The AP forwards data
over its wired interface towards the final destination. GTID passively collects traffic on a
wired segment between the AP and the final destination to identify the type of wireless
client. As depicted in Figure 8, GTID consists of four major components: feature extrac-
tion, signature generation, similarity measure and enroll.
Feature Extraction : As traffic is collected, the feature extraction process measures
traffic properties successively in time. Example measurements include inter-arrival time
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(IAT), round-trip-time (RTT), and packet size. The resulting feature vector is a time series
of values passed to the signature generation process for time-series analysis. When selecting
a feature to measure, it should preserve the information pertinent to the type of device and
capture discriminating properties for successful classification. This analysis uses the packet
IAT as the feature for fingerprinting a physical device. IAT measures the delay (∆t) between
successive packets and characterizes the traffic rate. The IAT feature vector is defined as:
f = (∆ t1,∆ t2,,∆ t3, ...,∆ ti) (1)
where ∆ ti is the inter-arrival time between packet i and i−1, and the first collected packet
is i = 0.
Figure 8: Overview of GTID
Signature Generation : The signature generation process uses statistical analysis to
reveal patterns embedded in the traffic measurements. This method adopts a time-domain
method for signature generation, which relies on the distribution of the IAT feature vector.
Distributions capture the frequency density of events over discrete intervals of time. Due to
the periodic nature of network traffic, distributions are a useful tool for traffic analysis. The
frequency count is defined as a vector that holds the number of IAT values falling within
each of the N equally spaced bins. Dividing the frequency count by the total number of
IAT values produces the probability distribution, p, which is the fingerprint. The interval
of time for a bin is refered to as its bin width, so the edges of the interval for the nth bin
are (binstart + (n − 1) ∗ binwidth) and (binstart + n ∗ binwidth), where binstart is the
minimum inter arrival time accommodated in the distribution.
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Algorithm 1 Device ID and Type Identification
1: Identify − ID − Type()
2: begin
3: ΘID,ΘType, Devlist, T ypelist ←MastersDB(Traffic Type)
4: ~λID, ~λType ←MaskingV ectors()
5: S ← IAT Sample()
6: Ω← generate signature(S)
7: ~outID ← ~λID ∗ ~sim(ΘID,Ω)
8: index, closeness← max( ~outID)
9: X ← 10 percentile TP (Devindexlist )
10: if (closeness > X)
11: return Devindexlist , Corresponding Type
12: else
13: ~outType ← ~λType ∗ ~sim(ΘType,Ω)
14: index, closeness← max( ~outType)
15: X ← 10 percentile TP (Typeindexlist )
16: if (closeness > X)





The device signature is sensitive to the bin width and different bin widths will reveal
different information about the feature vector. Smaller bin widths cause fewer IAT values
to occur within a particular bin, and what may appear to be meaningful information may
really be due to random variations in the traffic rate. Conversely, larger bin widths may
omit important information, aggregating information into fewer bins that might otherwise
help to discriminate between two different devices. Based on the experiments, N = 300 was
emperically determined to be an ideal choice for all traffic types tested in this paper. This
value of N is then used to determine the binwidths for each traffic type.
Similarity Measure : Once signatures are generated, it is passed through trained neural
networks that are present in the master database. This yields closeness values between 0
and 1 for each device in the database (note that 1 denotes a perfect match). These values of
closeness or similarity measures are used to compare an unknown signature to the master
signatures, which are essentially a collection of previously seen signatures.
Enroll : Signatures generated in step one are used to train Artificial Neural Networks
(ANNs) which registers the pattern and in essence enrolls that device or device type. ANNs
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are basically computational models inspired from biological neural networks and they imi-
tate them both structurally and functionally. An ANN consists of a group of interconnected
computational units called neurons. These neurons take in inputs and transform them ac-
cording to a specified activation function to generate an output. The technique uses ANNs
that belong to a class called feedforward networks, where there is only a one-way connection
from the input to the output layer. ANNs belonging to this class require supervised training
and are commonly used for prediction, pattern recognition and nonlinear function fitting.
The feedforward ANN is configured to use scaled conjugate gradient backpropagation as the
training function. The basic backpropagation algorithm adjusts weights in the steepest
descent direction (negative of the gradient). This is the direction in which the performance
function is decreasing most rapidly. It turns out that, although the function decreases most
rapidly along the negative of the gradient, this does not necessarily produce the fastest
convergence. In the conjugate gradient algorithms a search is performed along conjugate
directions, which generally produces faster convergence than steepest descent directions. It
should also be noted that the proposed technique uses sigmoid hidden and output neurons
which are ideal for pattern recognition. These produce a value between 0 and 1, where 1
denotes a perfect match in our case.
Figure 9 shows an example of an ANN that can be trained to classify M different device
or device types using signatures having N bins. This is a multi-layer feedforward ANN
which consists of an input layer, a hidden layer and an output layer. In this case, the
input layer takes in a vector of size N (b1 to bN ), and produces an output vector of size M
(d1 to dM ). The elements of the input vector correspond to the values in the probability
distribution (signature) and the elements of the output vector correspond to the similarity
measure between the input signature and the M device or device type signatures that it was
trained on. The number of hidden nodes P , that provide optimum results was emperically
determined to be 50. Two neural networks of this kind are used for each traffic type that is
analyzed. One is trained for device identification while the other is trained for device type
identification. Once trained, the neural networks (Θ) are stored in a master database for
future use.
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Figure 9: Sample Neural Network
4.3.2 Classification
As explained earlier, GTID compares a device in question with previously collected master
signatures and identifies the device in question and/or its type. The successful identification
of an unknown device with one of the master devices is refered as Device Identification and
the identification of the unknown device’s type with one of the master device types is refered
as Device Type Identification. For instance, GTID may have a collection of master signatures
for two identical Kindles. In this case, there will be two master device IDs (Kindle#1 and
Kindle#2) and one device type (eReader). Hence, given a set of master signatures, there
would be three applicable outcomes in identifying a device and its type.
Figure 10: CDF plot of closeness value for kindle fire - TCP traffic
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In the first one, GTID successfully recognizes the unknown device and its device type
because the samples from the unknown device match either one of the master signatures
of a device or master signatures of a device type in the signature database. In the second
one, GTID is not able to find a match for a given device and device type in the signature
database. Therefore, in this case, the sample device is classified as an unknown device. The
third outcome represents a case between the first two outcomes as the system is able to
identify the device’s type, but not the actual device associated with the tested device.
GTID’s core algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Based on the type of traffic (Table 3),
the system extracts the neural networks (ΘID, ΘType) and lists (Devlist, T ypelist) from
the master database (line 3). Masking vectors are then generated according to the subset
of master signatures that is used for comparison (line 4). The system then extracts the
unknown signature Ω from the unknown sample S (lines 5− 6). Once this is extracted, the
system feeds it into the device ID neural network (ΘID). The masked output generated by
the neural network is then used to get the index and the corresponding value of closeness
(lines 7−8). The closeness values range between 0 to 1, where 1 denotes a perfect match. If
the value of closeness fits the previously observed True-Positive (TP) closeness values (X),
the unknown signature is identified as the device pointed by the index and its corresponding
type (lines 9− 11). If not, similar steps are performed to get the index and closeness value
for device type using ΘType (lines 12−14). If the device type closeness satisfies the condition
in line 16, the system identifies the unknown signature to be from an Unknown device and
a known category pointed by the index, else the signature is identified to be from an
Unknown device and an Unknown type (lines 15 − 19). Note that the TP values used to
determine X come from a database of TP values which was created using a separate dataset.
Thus, GTID checks to see if the closeness value fits the previously seen TP distribution of
the master signature in order to determine whether a signature is classified as known or
unknown. An example distrubution of TP history for Kindle (device) and eReaders (device
type), along with the cutoff TPs Xdev and Xcat is shown in Figure 10. From the Kindle and
eReader TP distributions in Figure 10, it can be observed that device (Kindle) TPs (red
line) are more often closer to 1, compared to the device type (eReader) TPs (green line).
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The clearly observed difference in the distribution patterns of device TP, the device type
TP and TN from other devices (Figure 10) is in fact due to heterogeneity of the different
hardware composition (e.g., processor, DMA controller, memory) of the devices as well as
clock skew and possibly the intrinsic variation in the chip fabrication process. Therefore, a
tested device is first expected to be closest to its own signature, next to its type signature,
then to other devices, assuming the existence of a match for the signature of the tested
device.
4.3.3 Metrics for GTID’s Effectiveness
The performance of GTID is evaluated using accuracy and recall as our metrics similar to
[35]. Accuracy is defined as:
α =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (2)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN refer to True Positive, True Negative, False Positive, and False
Negative, respectively. The analysis uses accuracy to measure the overall performance of the






The analysis use both accuracy and recall because the sole usage of accuracy is mis-
leading when analyzing certain types of test cases (e.g., for test cases that do not allow the
entire cohort to contribute to all of the statistics). This is because accuracy, as shown in
Equation 2, requires statistics from the entire cohort of devices (i.e., TNs). This informa-
tion may not be available for certain experiments (i.e., different protocols on one device).
Hence, recall makes the evaluation independent of the impact of the other TNs and yields
a realistic performance focused only on TPs. Nonetheless, accuracy is still useful, for in-
stance, in analyzing the behavior across different traffic types of the entire cohort. Thus, in
the Performance Evaluation Section, accuracy is only populated where appropriate in the
results.
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Table 1: Isolated Network Device Specifications
Device Device ID Model Hardware Specification Operating System Kernel
Netbook
Dell 1
DELL Intel Atom N470 Ubuntu 10.04.1 LTS Kernel 2.6.32-24Dell 2






ARMv7 rev 3 (v7l) Maemo 5, Version Kernel 2.6.28




A4 processor @ 1GHz
iOS 4.0 (8A293) Kernel 10.3.1




A4 processor @ 1GHz
iOS 4.3.3 (8J2)
Kernel 11.0.0









iPad 3 iOS 3.2.2
Table 2: Campus Network Device Specifications




AS2 1.6 GHz Intel Atom processor-N2600 Ubuntu 12.04 (32 bit) Linux 3.2.0-29






2.4 GHz Intel Core i5-2430M Ubuntu 11.04 (64 bit) Linux 2.6.38 - 13




2.4 GHz Intel Core i5-2430M Ubuntu 11.04 (64 bit) Linux 2.6.38 - 13
D2 4GB RAM /Windows 7 (64 bit) - generic
ASUS Tablet
T1 ASUS Transformer 1.0GHz NVIDIA Tegra 2
Android 3.2.1 Kernel 2.6.36.3
T2 TF 101 dual-core CPU 1GB RAM
Google Nexus G1
Nexus One
1 GHz Qualcomm QSD8250
Android 2.2
Kernel 2.6.32.9




1 GHz Texas Instruments OMAP
Customized Android 2.3
Firmware 6.2.2




Intel Pentium M processor OS Version 2.0
-











CPU : Cell Processor PowerPC-base Core
XrossMediaBar Firmware Version 3.72
@3.2GHz. GPU: RSX @550MHz
P2
256MB XDR Main RAM @3.2GHz
256MB GDDR3 VRAM @700MHz
4.4 Performance Evaluation
This section evaluates the performance of GTID across three dimensions. First, the tech-
nique is analyzed in an isolated network environment (Figure 11). Traffic captures on this
setup was performed by the authors of [1]. The pcap files from their experimentation was
borrowed for analysis of the newly proposed technique. Second, the performance of GTID
is measured in a live campus network (Figure 13) during peak hours in both wireless and
wired setups. Finally, the effectiveness of GTID is studied under various attack scenarios.
4.4.1 Setup of Testbeds
Two automated testbeds were assembled to transmit and record traffic from the wireless
devices to the wired segment and vice versa. In the isolated testbed setup by the authors
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Figure 11: APL testbed setup
of [1] (Figure 11), a control machine (not shown in the figure) was used to send commands
to the different devices in the testbed for single and multiple hops scenarios. The device
under test was placed in an isolation box to reduce RF leakage and interference. For the
real network testbed (Figure 13), the AP and LAN destination were connected to a campus
backbone switch to test the device with real MAC and physical layer interference from other
wireless users in proximity, during peak hours. The same experiments were repeated using
the wired interface on devices, by connecting them directly into the back bone switch. A
total of 37 different devices, (Figure 12) were tested and the details of which are listed in
Tables 1 and 2.
4.4.2 Traffic & Signature Generation
Two generic applications were used to generate traffic in our testbeds. One was Iperf,
which was used to generate both TCP and UDP traffic at controlled rates, and the other
was Ping. The analysis also includes Active Fingerprinting for which IATs of ping responses
were used for characterizing a device. In addition to these, tests were performed using day
to day applications such as secure copy (SCP) and Skype. Table 3 presents the list of traffic
types and the associated parameters that were used for performance analysis.
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Figure 12: Devices used
The analysis uses one hour of traffic from each of these traffic types. The captures for
the devices listed in Table 1 was provided by the authors of [1], while the rest was captured
by us using the automated testbed shown in Figure 13. In addition to these, a few wireside
captures were also made to show that GTID can be applied for both wired and wireless
environments. This produces a total of 400+ hours (more than 500 gigabytes) of traffic
which was used to evaluate GTID. The first half of each capture is used for training the
ANN and the second half is used for performance analysis. The best sample size for a good
overall performance of GTID was empirically determined to be 2.5K packets.
GTID operates in two modes: Known and Unknown. The known mode refers to a case
where GTID attempts to recognize a previously seen device among other previously seen
Table 3: Traffic Types Used in Experiments




1 -b 1M -t 3600 -l 56
2 2 -b 1M -t 3600 -l 1400
3 3 -b 8M -t 3600 -l 56
4 4 -b 8M -t 3600 -l 1400
5 Iperf - TCP 1 -t 3600
6 SCP 1 1.7 GB
7 Skype - UDP 1 Video
8
Ping
1 -s 56 -0.01 -c 360000
9 2 -s 1400 -i 0.01 -c 360000
10
Active Ping Response
1 -s 56 -i 0.01 -c 360000
11 2 -s 1400 -i 0.01 -c 360000
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Figure 13: Campus testbed setup
devices and therefore, has a master signature associated with the device in question. Hence,
in this case, GTID either correctly identifies the device and the device type (category) or
mis-identifies them. In the unknown mode of test, GTID is exposed to both devices it has
previously seen and devices that it has not previously seen. Hence, in this case, GTID does
not have the necessary master signature associated with a sample device tested. As a result,
if GTID does not recognize a device, it then identifies it as an unknown device, otherwise
it identifies the type and/or the device. The two different modes work best for different
scenarios. For example, in a benign network, the known mode, which has better accuracy
and recall, can be used for inventory control. However, in a network where access control
is a concern, GTID can be employed in unknown mode. Using the accuracy (α) and recall
(γ) metrics explained in Section 4.3.3, the overall effectiveness of our technique is analyzed
for these different modes. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, the performance analysis specific
to device IDs and device types, only focuses on γ, because α is inflated superfluously by
TNs. Note that this is not needed for results per traffic type because all traffic from devices
and types are aggregated for each traffic type; hence, results pertinent to both metrics are
included.
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4.4.3 Experimental Results from Isolated Testbed - Wireless
Table 4: Isolated Network Testbed (Passive Analysis)
Device ID Device Type
Known Unknown Known Unknown
Dev α γ α γ Type α γ α γ
Max Netbook #5 - 1.00 - 0.93 iPhone4 - 0.99 - 0.89
Min Iphone4 #2 - 0.74 - 0.66 iPhone3G - 0.15 - 0.18
Traffic Type Traffic Type
Max UDP 1400B 1Mbps 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.82 UDP 1400B 1Mbps 0.87 0.66 0.87 0.61
Min SCP 0.99 0.89 0.97 0.80 SCP 0.87 0.67 0.87 0.61
Avg 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.81 0.87 0.67 0.88 0.64
The captures generated by the authors of [1] were used to test the performance of
GTID in an isolated network environment (Figure 11). Conducting experiments in an
isolated network allowed for fundamental and deeper understanding of the overall technique.
Specifically, we seek to understand: (1) What is the overall accuracy and recall of this
technique in an isolated environment? (2) Is there a protocol/rate that works the best for
this technique in the testbed? (3) Are there devices that are more amenable to this technique?
(4) How does data rate affect this technique overall? A summary of results for this analysis
is shown in Table 4. For more detailed results, please refer to Section A.1.
In a single hop case, as seen in Table 4, the device with the maximum γ is Netbook #5
with 100% while the device with the minimum γ is iPhone4 #2 with 74% and the average
is 94% for the device identification analysis in the known analysis mode. For the same
devices, in the unknown mode, the maximum, minimum, and the average fall to 93%, 66%,
and 81%. The maximum, minimum, and the average recall values for both known and
unknown test modes for device types identification are lower compared to that of device
identification. The average recall values are 67% and 64% for the known and unknown test
modes, respectively. One reason for this is lack of enough representative devices to train
for device type identification. Since most device types have only two devices (Table 2), we
had to use one device for training (which wasn’t sufficient) and the other for performance
evaluation. It is shown through experiments in Section 4.4.4 that recall of device type
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identification can be significantly improved by using more number of training samples (Fig-
ure 14). As for the protocols and applications tested, UDP with the rate of 1Mbps shows
a recall of 97% (known) and 82% (unknown) for device identification and 66% (known)
and 61% (unknown) for device type identification. The minimum for this four-tuple, de-
vice identification (known: 89% vs. unknown: 80%) and device type identification (known:
67% vs. unknown: 61%) belongs to the SCP application. The slight performance penalty
with SCP, in comparison with UDP, is attributed to the additional processing time that is
specific to the application layer (e.g., encryption).
4.4.4 Experimental Results from Campus Network - Wireless
Both active and passive experiments were conducted on a live network to determine the
feasibility of the technique and to provide bounds on the performance of GTID in realistic
deployments. The real network analysis was specifically meant to answer the following set
of question: What is the overall accuracy (α) and recall (γ) of this technique in a real net-
work? and Is there a traffic type or device that is more amenable to this technique? The
results of the active and passive analysis for the campus network analysis are summarized
in Table 5 and Table 6 respectively. For detailed results, please refer to Section A.2
Table 5: Campus Network - Wireless (Passive Analysis)
Device ID Device Type
Known Unknown Known Unknown
Device α γ α γ Device Type α γ α γ
Max Kindle #2 - 0.93 - 0.85 Asus Netbook - 0.99 - 0.87
Min Tablet #2 - 0.48 - 0.41 Google Ph - 0.22 - 0.30
Test Type Test Type
Max UDP 1400B 8Mbps 0.96 0.80 0.95 0.70 Skype 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.90
Min TCP 0.95 0.74 0.94 0.56 UDP 1400B 8Mbps 0.77 0.54 0.80 0.52
Avg 0.95 0.74 0.94 0.64 0.86 0.68 0.87 0.63
Passive Analysis : As seen in Table 5, in the campus network testbed the device with the
maximum γ is Kindle #2 with 93% while the device with the minimum γ is Asus Tablet
#2 with 48% and the average is 74% for the device identification analysis in the known
operational mode. In the unknown mode of these devices, the maximum, minimum, and
the average γ fall to 85%, 41%, and 64%, respectively. Similar to what was observed in
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the isolated experiments, the maximum, minimum, and the average recall values for both
known and unknown test modes for device type identification is less compared to device
identification. The average values of recall are 68% and 63% for the known and unknown
test modes, respectively. As mentioned in Section 4.4.3, the performance of device type
identification can be significantly improved by using more number of training samples for
each type of device. Figure 14 shows the results of an experiment that was conducted to
see if our hypothesis was true.
Figure 14: Effect of Increasing Training Data
This particular experiment starts by training on one representative device for each device
type, and continues to increase in steps of 1, the number of representative devices used to
train the Asus netbooks (device type). From the results (Figure 14), the recall of the Asus
netbook (device type) is clearly observed to increase as the number of training samples is
increased. As for the applications and protocols, maximum and minimum are different for
device identification and device type tests. Specifically, for the device identification tests,
UDP with a rate of 8Mbps and 1400B payload exhibits the maximum γ: 80% while for the
device type tests, the maximum is achieved by Skype traffic with γ: 96%. Further results on
the recall for all traffic types and devices/device types are shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16
respectively. In the future, we plan to determine why the recall values of these signatures
are traffic and device type dependent.
By comparing the results of the real network to the isolated network, one can observe
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Figure 15: Recall vs Traffic Types
Figure 16: Recall vs Devices/DeviceTypes
the degradation in performance across both α and γ in the real network. It is also observed
that the device identification results are better than the device type identification, across
all the cases. This can be attributed to the lack of enough devices to train for each device
type.
Results from the analysis of the impact of physical and MAC layer interference on the
real network is presented in Figure 17. Focusing on the similarity measures for these two
testbeds, it is seen that more than 50% of the similarity measures have values close to 1
(which denotes a perfect match) in the isolated testbed, while its less than 30% for the
real testbed. This difference is attributed to the uncontrolled characteristics of the physical
medium which make inter arrival patterns look less similar in the real network.
Finally, the slight performance decrease associated with the unknown test mode ob-
served in all the test scenarios (Figure 15) is attributed to the nature of the identification
algorithm. However, our binary identification technique utilizing TPs, FPs, TNs, and FNs,
shows strong promise for the effectiveness of GTID (given its numerous benefits).
Active Analysis : In this analysis, ping requests were used as probes to trigger responses
(ping response) from the device. Using this method, a network administrator will be able
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Figure 17: Effect of MAC Contention
to fingerprint any device that responds to ping (e.g., IP camera). Due to this advantage,
we were able to fingerprint a total of 23 devices using this technique. The list includes
devices such as play station, apple TV, IP camera, HP printer, etc. Ping requests of two
different payload sizes (Table 3) were sent at 10ms interval to generate a continuous stream
of responses from the targeted device. The IATs from the response stream were then
analyzed using GTID. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: Campus Network - Wireless (Active Analysis)
Device ID Device Type
Known Unknown Known Unknown
Device α γ α γ Device Type α γ α γ
Max Kindle #2 - 0.91 - 0.85 Printer - 1.00 - 0.91
Min Printer #2 - 0.35 - 0.08 Laptop - 0.55 - 0.56
Test Type Test Type
Max Ping 1400B 0.97 0.72 0.96 0.58 Ping 1400B 0.95 0.77 0.94 0.71
Min Ping 56B 0.97 0.66 0.96 0.51 Ping 56B 0.94 0.71 0.94 0.70
Avg 0.97 0.69 0.96 0.55 0.94 0.74 0.94 0.70
From the results summary shown in Table 6, it can be observed that Kindle #2 once
again has the highest γ of 91%, which shows that it quite suitable for fingerprinting using
GTID. The minimum recall was shown by the HP printer with 35% recall in the known
mode of operation. However, the same printer has the highest value of recall for device type
identification. This shows that the printers possess signatures that are very different from
other types of devices, but quite similar to each other. From the per traffic type analysis, it
can be seen that Ping with 1400Byte payload does better than Ping with a 56Byte payload.
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This holds good for both device and device type identification and also across both known
and unknown analysis. This we believe is due to the fact that a continuous stream of
large packets will involve more memory operations, which in turn will provide a stronger
fingerprint of the device’s hardware. In general, the active mode of fingerprinting performs
slightly worse compared to the passive analysis. This is because, in active fingerprinting,
the IAT patterns embed the signature of both the probing device and the target device.
Looking into methods for removing the sender’s signature from the IAT pattern is a part
of the proposed future work.
4.4.5 Experimental Results from Campus Network - Wireline
This section briefly shows that GTID can be easily extended to a wired environment and
thus is not limited to a wireless setup. In this setup, the target devices are directly wired into
the backbone switch instead of connecting through an AP as shown in Figure 13. Similar
to the analysis in Section 4.4.4, both active and passive traffic types are used to evalu-
ate the performance of GTID in a wired environment. A summary of results obtained from
this analysis is shown in Table 7 and 8. For more detailed results, please refer to Section A.3.
Table 7: Campus Network - Wireline (Passive Analysis)
Device ID Device Type
Known Unknown Known Unknown
Device α γ α γ Device Type α γ α γ
Max Dell #1 - 1.0 - 0.88 AsusNetbook - 1.00 - 0.84
Min AsusNetbook #2 - 0.39 - 0.35 Dell - 0.26 - 0.41
Test Type Test Type
Max Ping 56B 0.97 0.86 0.94 0.72 TCP 0.91 0.87 0.96 0.90
Min UDP 56B 1Mbps 0.89 0.50 0.88 0.42 UDP 1400B 1Mbps 0.66 0.49 0.75 0.51
Avg 0.92 0.65 0.92 0.68 0.92 0.57 0.84 0.67
Passive Analysis: The summary of results in Table 7 shows that GTID is feasible on
a wired network as well. Dell #1 shows the highest value of recall for device identification
while Asus netbooks show the best recall for device type identification. One major reason
for this is that, Asus netbooks had many more devices to train for the device type, while the
rest of the devices had just one (refer Figure 14). While one would expect the performance
of GTID to be better on a wired network as compared to a wireless network (no physical
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or MAC layer contention), this is not what was observed. The results of the wired network
analysis show slight degradation in the performance of GTID in comparison to the results
obtained from the wireless setup. The reasons for this could be 1) use of different sets of
devices for analysis in the wired and wireless analysis; and 2) binwidths for a wired network
might have to be configured differently due to lesser timing fluctuations and higher rates.
A more detailed analysis of this will be done as a part of the future work. With respect
to traffic type analysis, we see that that TCP is performing the best with a recall of 90%.
However, in the wireless analysis, TCP performed poorly (recall of 59%) when compared
to other traffic types (refer Table 20 in Appendix). This shows the impact of delays and
retransmissions on a wireless network which directly impacts the behavior of TCP flows.
The absence of such delays and packet losses on wired networks produced more consistent
IAT patterns and thus better signatures for TCP. It is also seen that 1400 byte UDP traffic
at 1Mbps has the lowest recall for both the wired and wireless analysis. This traffic type
is one of the slowest in our analysis with average inter arrival times of 11.2ms. This shows
that GTID works better with traffic that have higher packet rate (i.e., smaller IAT).
Table 8: Campus Network - Wireline (Active Analysis)
Device ID Device Type
Known Unknown Known Unknown
Device α γ α γ Device Type α γ α γ
Max PlayStation #2 - 0.98 - 0.91 Apple TV - 1.00 - 0.90
Min AsusNetbook #5 - 0.21 - 0.45 Dell - 0.08 - 0.05
Test Type Test Type
Max Ping 1400B 0.96 0.67 0.96 0.61 Ping 56B 0.96 0.87 0.94 0.75
Min Ping 56B 0.96 0.66 0.94 0.49 Ping 1400B 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.77
Avg 0.96 0.66 0.95 0.55 0.96 0.85 0.94 0.76
Active Analysis : Table 8 shows a summary of results obtained for Active analysis on
a wired network. It can be observed that PlayStation#2 shows the best performance for
device identification while the AsusNetbook#5 shows the worst. This might be partially
due to the fact that there are more AsusNetbooks in the list of devices compared to the
rest which have only two. For device type identification, AppleTV has the highest recall
(100%) while Dell has the lowest. It is easy to see from Table, 7 and 8 that the Dell device
type is the most difficult to classify. After further investigation, it was found that the Dells
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had a few differences in the hardware (including the NICs) even though they were sold
with the same model number. This, in a way shows the sensitivity of GTID to hardware
differences/similarities.
4.5 Attacker Models
Figure 18: PDF of UDP IATs for Normal and Attacker Traffic
Figure 19: PDF of Ping Response IATs for Normal and Attacker Traffic
This section seeks to determine the effectiveness of GTID under a number of attack
scenarios. This analysis assumes that the attacker has some knowledge of the detection
technique and is capable of controlling his device’s network traffic. Given that this technique
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is IAT-based, a novice attacker would be prompted to do one of the following: (1) Introduce
constant/random delays to packet stream; (2) Vary the packet size; (3) Modify/change the
operating system; (4) Load the CPU with intensive applications to over shadow normal
behavior ; (5) Tunnel packets through another protocol. These attacks were carried out in
an attempt to evade GTID. In the scenario, we assume all the devices are known. GTID
detects these attacks and classifies all of these devices that generated attack traffic from
previously seen devices as unknown, which is a red flag to a network administrator. The
variation in the IAT distribution patterns (from normal) observed in Figure 18, 20, 19, and
21 explains why GTID was able to identify the attacker traffic.
Figure 20: O/S Attack
However, if the attacker is highly skilled and knowledgeable of the technique, she could
try to emulate an authorized device in order to establish/maintain network access. To do
this, the attacker would need the distribution of the difference in the IATs of her device
and the device that she wants to emulate. Once she has this information, she can feed
it into a network emulation tool like netem (which is available in linux kernels 2.6 and
higher) to transmit packets in accordance with the distribution. When such an attack
is performed, one would expect the attacker’s device to be classified as a known device.
However, as seen in Figure 21 this is not true. Figure 21 shows the IAT distribution when
the Lenovo laptop attempted to behave like a Kindle. Clearly, the distribution of the
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emulated traffic is different from the actual and the targeted device and GTID labels this
traffic as unknown. Also, the IATs are observed to be more distributed when compared to
the unaltered device. One of the primary factors that prevented an accurate emulation is
the fact that the attacker’s device has to simultaneously spoof a signature of a device and
attempt to hide its innate signature. This is because, the variation in the IATs that the
device attempts replicate gets added to its innate timing variation with results in a signature
that is different from both the device that is trying to emulate and the device that is being
emulated. It is important to note that the theory behind GTID is that different devices
essentially ”talk” differently (i.e., they have a different cadence), so as illustrated above,
it is difficult for even a more powerful device to emulate the traffic distribution of a less
powerful device.
Figure 21: Laptop Emulates a Kindle
4.6 Sub-module Architecture
Detection techniques need to be quick in order to be of any practical use. High accuracy
with high latency may lead to correct, but less useful results. In order to study the detection
speed of this technique, a prototype version of GTID was developed in MATLAB and its
performance was tested. The internal architecture of the prototype is shown in Figure 22.
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4.6.1 Overview
The basic purpose of this tool is to match a sample from a given network traffic with a list
of previously stored signatures. This is achieved using a three stage process as explained
below.
Stage1 : Network Traffic Collection : Before starting to collect traffic from the
network interface, the tool takes in necessary parameters such as Sample Size (S ), Number
of Samples (N ), and MAC address of the suspicious device. Tcpdump is then used at the
back end to collect and save N number of pcap files, each containing captures of S+1 packet
headers. These files are sent to stage two (identification) of the process as and when they
are captured. This results in a pipeline which thereby contributes to the speed up GTID’s
detection time. Another alternative that the tool supports is taking existing pcap files as
input. When this option is used, the tool parses the given pcap file in stage one and sends N
IAT matrices of size S to stage two of the process. In this case, stages one and two cannot
be pipelined and therefore, the time required to complete stage one is highly dependent on
the size of the pcap file. Analysis of preexisting captures is very handy in forensics.
Stage2 : Identification : At this stage, once a pcap sample arrives, IAT values are
extracted using [36]. After extraction, the IAT values are passed to the identification module
which is the core module of this entire process. This module is responsible for matching
the given IAT pattern to a preexisting pattern in the master database. After processing,
it gives out the identified device/type along with the similarity measures. This process of
extraction and identification can be done in parallel because each incoming pcap file is a
separate sample. In order to parallelize this process, the tool assigns each sample to a new
thread that runs on a separate core or hyper threads in the CPU. This is done using n
matlabpool workers and parallel loops. If this stage receives sampled IAT matrices, then it
skips the extraction phase and directly enters into the process of identification as shown in
Figure 22. This happens when pcap files are fed into stage one of the process.
Stage3 : Decision Making : The decision making stage is simple and straight forward.
It waits and accumulates all the results obtained from the identification module until the
N th sample is identified. Once it has all N results, it checks for the device/type that has
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Figure 22: Real-Time Implementation
matched most of the input samples and declares that device/type as the final identified
device/type. The tool uses the graphical user interface (GUI) provided by the proposed
framework to take in values and display results. The GUI can be used to set all the
parameters that are required for traffic capture and identification. Moreover, it has features
which enables the user to select a subset of all the master signatures that is in the database
which will in turn help in both speeding up the identification process and also in reducing
the number of FPs. This is useful if one has an idea of the type of unknown device that is
under test.
4.6.2 Performance Analysis
In order to quantify the performance of this technique, timing analysis was performed on
the GTID tool. The two most important factors that delay the identification process are
capture time and processing time. The capture time is in turn dependent on the sample
size and the processing time is in turn dependent on the algorithm and processing power.
Table 9 shows the variation in the time taken to identify a device when the sample sizes
are varied. The time taken to capture increases linearly with an increase in sample size (as
expected). However the processing time increases at a slower rate. This is evident from the
decrease in the percentage of processing time from 4% to 2%, as sample size is increased
from 1K to 50K IATs.
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Table 9: Timing analysis for variation in sample sizes : Traffic - UDP 1400byte 8Mbps ,
Number of samples 20
Sample Capture Processing %Processing
Size Time(s) Time(s) Time
1K 1.18 0.051 4.14
2.5K 3.95 0.12 2.95
5K 7.59 0.199 2.55
7.5K 11.28 0.28 2.42
10K 14.98 0.38 2.47
30K 44.27 1.15 2.53
50K 73.61 1.18 1.58
Table 10: Effect of Parallelizing the Process : Sample Size 2500, Number of Samples 20
Test Type
Total Processing Time(s)
1 Thread 8 Thread
UDP 56B 1Mbps 30.66 26.24
UDP 56B 8Mbps 11.49 6.67
Since the capture time is inversely proportional to the packet rate, the percentage of
the processing time will not be as low as it appears in Table 9. At high data rates, the
processing time will start to become the performance bottle neck. The only way to overcome
this bottle neck is by parallelizing the identification process. Table 10 shows the time saved
by the tool when it was run over a single core and over a hyper threaded quad-core CPU
(Intel Corei7). Clearly, the process of parallelizing pays off when the packet rate increases,
or in other words, when the processing time becomes comparable to that of the capture




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work introduces a framework for fingerprinting networked systems. The design con-
sists of three modules that are independent from one another, thus enabling easy modifi-
cation/improvements in the future. Such a design enables easy addition/removal of net-
work interfaces, network monitoring tools and fingerprinting techniques. The framework
integrates the individual fingerprinting modules using a centralized decision engine which
makes the process of fingerprinting more robust. At present, the framework supports a lim-
ited number of interfaces and fingerprinting techniques. However, in the future, this will be
extended to include techniques such as clock skew identification, AP fingerprinting, protocol
fingerprinting, etc. Currently, the decision module provides users the control over customiz-
ing the weights for a particular technique. In the future, the framework will be improved
to auto detect the climate of the targeted network to adjust the weights accordingly.
This work also introduces GTID, a passive technique for device and device type finger-
printing. GTID exploits the heterogeneity of devices, which is a function of the different
device hardware compositions and the inherent variation clock skews. This technique was
applied to the challenging problem of access control in 802.11 networks. The effectiveness
and the practicality of GTID was demonstrated on both an isolated testbed and a live cam-
pus network using artificial neural networks. Further, it was shown, using a collection of
37 devices with a diverse set of operating systems, that GTID had high accuracy and good
recall in identifying previously seen and unknown devices and device types. This work also
addresses the efficacy of GTID under various attack models and considered the performance
of a real-time implementation of GTID. In the future, this work will be extended to un-
derstand the efficacy of GTID when device and device type identification is conducted over
various access links (e.g., DSL, LTE). Additionally, the robustness of GTID will be improved
to better handle congestion on links and variation in levels of load on a node. Further, the
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application of GTID will be extended to detecting, counterfeit devices, resource utilization
on a node, devices behind a NAT, virtual machines and malware activity. Finally, analysis





This Appendix section presents detailed results of all experiments that were summarized in
Sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5.
A.1 Results from Isolated Wireless Experiments
A.1.1 Known Analysis
Table 11: Device ID - Known Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Udp C1 UdpC2 Udp C3 Tcp C1 Scp C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevDN1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.98 1.00
DevDN2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.99
DevDN3 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.75 0.98 0.74 0.98 0.92 0.99
DevNP1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.98 1.00
DevNP2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.88 0.99 0.98 1.00
DevIP1 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.98 0.96 1.00
DevIP2 0.90 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.97 1.00
DevIP3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
DevIT1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.98 0.96 1.00
DevIT2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DevIF1 0.80 0.93 0.70 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.85 0.98 0.82 0.98 0.65 0.94 0.84 0.94 0.80 0.96
DevIF2 0.37 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.99 0.83 0.98 0.88 0.98 0.59 0.95 0.69 0.97 0.74 0.96
DevDN4 -NA- -NA- -NA- -NA- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DevDN5 -NA- -NA- -NA- -NA- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
PerFlow(Avg) 0.92 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.92 0.99 0.89 0.98 0.94 0.99
Table 12: Device Type - Known Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Udp C1 UdpC2 Udp C3 Tcp C1 Scp C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DellNetbook 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.72 0.85 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.83 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.76 0.94 0.91
NokiaPhone 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.48 0.89 0.85 0.97 0.79 0.95 0.73 0.94
iPad 0.58 0.92 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.72 0.47 0.66 0.67 0.74 0.50 0.70 0.18 0.71 0.53 0.74
iPhone3G 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.81 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.80 0.15 0.80
iPhone4G 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.94
PerFlow (Avg) 0.92 0.97 0.55 0.82 0.67 0.87 0.66 0.87 0.63 0.85 0.67 0.87 0.58 0.83 0.67 0.87
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A.1.2 Unknown Analysis
Table 13: Device ID - Unknown Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Udp C1 UdpC2 Udp C3 Tcp C1 Scp C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevDN1 0.95 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.65 0.98 0.42 0.96 0.77 0.98 0.86 0.99 0.78 0.98 0.77 0.98
DevDN2 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.79 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.89 0.99
DevDN3 1.00 1.00 0.18 0.94 0.69 0.98 0.70 0.98 0.64 0.98 0.65 0.98 0.72 0.98 0.65 0.98
DevNP1 0.98 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.80 0.99 0.75 0.98 0.82 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.85 0.99
DevNP2 0.85 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.22 0.95 0.67 0.98 0.45 0.96 0.71 0.98
DevIP1 0.88 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.76 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.88 0.99 0.58 0.97 0.82 0.99
DevIP2 0.58 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.64 0.97 0.89 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.99 0.85 0.99 0.82 0.99
DevIP3 0.93 0.99 0.88 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.83 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.88 0.99
DevIT1 0.95 1.00 0.85 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.82 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.54 0.97 0.83 0.99
DevIT2 0.85 0.99 0.82 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.87 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.90 0.99
DevIF1 0.69 0.94 0.67 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.80 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.71 0.96 0.83 0.93 0.77 0.96
DevIF2 0.37 0.92 0.86 0.99 0.78 0.99 0.73 0.98 0.84 0.98 0.50 0.95 0.54 0.97 0.66 0.97
DevDN4 -NA- -NA- -NA- -NA- 0.69 0.98 0.81 0.99 0.88 0.99 0.76 0.98 0.80 0.99 0.79 0.99
DevDN5 -NA- -NA- -NA- -NA- 0.95 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.83 0.99 0.93 0.99
Unknown 0.85 0.89 0.94 0.84 0.97 0.85 0.97 0.84 0.98 0.82 0.87 0.84 0.79 0.85 0.91 0.85
PerFlow(Avg) 0.83 0.97 0.84 0.97 0.83 0.98 0.82 0.98 0.80 0.97 0.80 0.97 0.76 0.97 0.81 0.97
Table 14: Device Type - Unknown Analysis Results in Isolated Experiment (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Udp C1 UdpC2 Udp C3 Tcp C1 Scp C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DellNetbook 0.94 0.99 0.84 0.97 0.59 0.92 0.76 0.96 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.95 0.89 0.84 0.83 0.94
NokiaPhone 0.93 0.99 0.13 0.85 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.98 0.58 0.83 0.82 0.90 0.55 0.91 0.69 0.92
iPad 0.69 0.95 0.72 0.80 0.73 0.89 0.43 0.73 0.80 0.88 0.47 0.88 0.14 0.73 0.57 0.84
iPhone3G 0.88 0.98 0.37 0.86 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.83 0.18 0.83
iPhone4G 0.95 0.99 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.99 0.85 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.78 0.93 0.89 0.96
Unknown 1.00 0.90 0.56 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.65 0.80 0.61 0.79 0.62 0.77 0.50 0.71 0.68 0.79
PerFlow(Avg) 0.90 0.97 0.58 0.86 0.67 0.89 0.61 0.87 0.62 0.87 0.61 0.87 0.48 0.83 0.64 0.88
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A.2 Results from Wireless Campus Network
A.2.1 Known Analysis
A.2.1.1 Passive Fingerprinting
Table 15: Device ID - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 Scp C1 Skype C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.65 0.96 0.71 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.80 0.98 0.91 0.99 0.51 0.96 -NA- -NA- 0.78 0.97
DevAS2 0.83 0.96 0.58 0.95 0.53 0.94 0.73 0.96 0.70 0.93 0.86 0.97 0.23 0.93 -NA- -NA- 0.64 0.95
DevAS3 0.70 0.96 0.88 0.97 0.72 0.95 0.88 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.78 0.95 -NA- -NA- 0.85 0.97
DevAS4 0.58 0.90 0.44 0.93 0.74 0.98 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.88 0.97 0.69 0.95 -NA- -NA- 0.72 0.95
DevAS5 0.23 0.91 0.77 0.96 0.40 0.92 0.47 0.93 0.23 0.92 0.75 0.96 0.95 0.92 -NA- -NA- 0.54 0.93
DevG1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.95 0.97 0.95 1.00 -NA- -NA- 0.93 0.99
DevG2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.55 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.05 0.90 0.85 0.97 0.99 1.00 -NA- -NA- 0.78 0.97
DevL1 0.75 0.95 0.28 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.80 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.95 0.98 0.77 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.79 0.97
DevL2 0.60 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.50 0.93 0.70 0.93 0.97 0.99 0.86 0.96 0.83 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.96
DevT1 0.75 0.91 0.81 0.95 0.28 0.91 0.61 0.93 0.53 0.95 0.31 0.91 0.68 0.94 0.55 0.79 0.57 0.91
DevT2 0.03 0.91 0.58 0.95 0.50 0.92 0.41 0.92 0.67 0.88 0.46 0.91 0.59 0.95 0.60 0.79 0.48 0.90
DevK1 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.93 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.69 0.96 -NA- -NA- 0.95 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.91 0.99
DevK2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.78 0.97 -NA- -NA- 0.93 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.93 0.99
PerFlow(Avg) 0.70 0.95 0.77 0.96 0.66 0.95 0.76 0.96 0.71 0.95 0.80 0.96 0.76 0.96 0.77 0.88 0.74 0.95
Table 16: Device Type - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 Scp C1 Skype C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.97 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -NA- -NA- 0.99 0.99
GooglePhone 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.80 0.65 0.81 0.25 0.81 0.20 0.77 0.40 0.80 0.04 0.81 -NA- -NA- 0.22 0.80
Laptop 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.73 0.67 0.84 0.56 0.85 0.01 0.67 1.00 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.70 0.88
Tablet 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.86 0.84 0.72 0.66 0.79 0.77 0.61 0.99 0.95 1.00 0.96 0.86 0.81
eReader 0.25 0.69 0.20 0.68 0.54 0.89 -NA- -NA- 0.92 0.98 -NA- -NA- 0.95 0.85 -NA- -NA- 0.57 0.82
PerFlow(Avg) 0.64 0.86 0.64 0.85 0.64 0.86 0.69 0.84 0.66 0.86 0.54 0.77 0.80 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.68 0.86
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A.2.1.2 Active Fingerprinting
Table 17: Device ID - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.54 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.74 0.98
DevAS2 0.77 0.95 0.95 1.00 0.86 0.97
DevAS3 0.58 0.95 0.40 0.95 0.49 0.95
DevAS4 0.56 0.96 0.49 0.95 0.53 0.96
DevAS5 0.42 0.96 0.56 0.96 0.49 0.96
DevC1 0.64 0.97 0.49 0.97 0.56 0.97
DevC2 0.49 0.97 0.86 0.98 0.67 0.97
DevP1 0.94 0.96 0.77 0.97 0.85 0.97
DevP2 0.15 0.95 0.54 0.97 0.35 0.96
DevG1 0.86 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.99
DevG2 0.79 0.98 0.78 0.98 0.79 0.98
DevL1 0.42 0.96 0.73 0.95 0.58 0.95
DevL2 0.92 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.91 0.98
DevH1 0.76 0.97 0.88 0.99 0.82 0.98
DevH2 0.68 0.97 0.77 0.98 0.72 0.98
DevA1 0.64 0.95 0.22 0.96 0.43 0.95
DevA2 0.79 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.88 0.99
DevT1 0.59 0.95 0.67 0.94 0.63 0.95
DevT2 0.49 0.96 0.41 0.95 0.45 0.96
DevK1 0.91 0.99 0.90 1.00 0.90 0.99
DevK2 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.99 0.91 0.99
PerFlow(Avg) 0.66 0.97 0.72 0.97 0.69 0.97
Table 18: Device Type - Known Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.94
Camera 0.53 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.71 0.94
Gaming 0.74 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.87 0.97
GooglePhone 0.81 0.96 0.75 0.95 0.78 0.96
Laptop 0.58 0.94 0.51 0.88 0.55 0.91
Printer 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TV 0.12 0.86 0.26 0.90 0.19 0.88
Tablet 0.79 0.90 0.82 0.94 0.81 0.92
eReader 0.88 0.98 0.67 0.94 0.78 0.96




Table 19: Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 Scp C1 Skype C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.48 0.95 0.70 0.95 0.83 0.96 0.81 0.98 0.53 0.97 0.74 0.97 0.22 0.94 -NA- -NA- 0.62 0.96
DevAS2 0.83 0.97 0.57 0.95 0.41 0.93 0.70 0.96 0.60 0.95 0.91 0.98 0.38 0.92 -NA- -NA- 0.63 0.95
DevAS3 0.64 0.93 0.75 0.97 0.64 0.95 0.79 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.77 0.94 -NA- -NA- 0.77 0.96
DevAS4 0.61 0.92 0.33 0.92 0.53 0.97 0.73 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.67 0.97 0.13 0.93 -NA- -NA- 0.56 0.94
DevAS5 0.13 0.92 0.78 0.96 0.27 0.92 0.33 0.92 0.03 0.92 0.72 0.96 0.76 0.92 -NA- -NA- 0.43 0.93
DevG1 0.78 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.52 0.93 0.94 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.84 0.98 0.79 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.82 0.98
DevG2 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.36 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.25 0.93 0.75 0.96 0.94 1.00 -NA- -NA- 0.75 0.97
DevL1 0.60 0.95 0.16 0.94 0.83 0.98 0.72 0.96 0.84 0.99 0.75 0.98 0.56 0.95 0.74 0.94 0.65 0.96
DevL2 0.43 0.94 0.77 0.95 0.48 0.94 0.67 0.94 1.00 0.99 0.73 0.96 0.64 0.95 0.88 0.98 0.70 0.96
DevT1 0.68 0.91 0.87 0.97 0.29 0.91 0.66 0.93 0.21 0.93 0.29 0.92 0.53 0.94 0.66 0.85 0.52 0.92
DevT2 0.04 0.90 0.61 0.96 0.43 0.92 0.21 0.92 0.53 0.90 0.39 0.91 0.42 0.94 0.66 0.85 0.41 0.91
DevK1 1.00 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.84 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.22 0.94 -NA- -NA- 0.85 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.77 0.98
DevK2 0.93 0.99 0.74 0.98 0.84 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.84 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.93 0.99 -NA- -NA- 0.85 0.99
Unknown 0.48 0.84 0.59 0.85 0.55 0.80 0.67 0.85 0.66 0.81 0.72 0.82 0.63 0.83 0.59 0.77 0.61 0.82
PerFlow(Avg) 0.62 0.94 0.70 0.96 0.56 0.94 0.69 0.95 0.60 0.94 0.70 0.95 0.61 0.94 0.70 0.88 0.64 0.94
Table 20: Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 Scp C1 Skype C1 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.97 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.90 0.98 0.87 0.98 0.80 0.95 0.90 0.98 0.69 0.95 -NA- -NA- 0.87 0.97
GooglePhone 0.06 0.84 0.08 0.82 0.61 0.84 0.46 0.89 0.38 0.83 0.50 0.86 0.02 0.82 -NA- -NA- 0.30 0.84
Laptop 0.92 0.95 0.94 0.99 0.45 0.79 0.77 0.91 0.42 0.86 0.03 0.73 0.93 0.99 0.84 0.96 0.66 0.90
Tablet 0.80 0.92 0.83 0.93 0.50 0.88 0.79 0.81 0.50 0.83 0.74 0.73 0.88 0.97 0.88 0.97 0.74 0.88
eReader 0.35 0.78 0.33 0.75 0.53 0.91 -NA- -NA- 0.59 0.93 -NA- -NA- 0.77 0.91 -NA- -NA- 0.51 0.85
Unknown 0.72 0.79 0.53 0.74 0.55 0.78 0.67 0.82 0.61 0.71 0.40 0.72 0.81 0.73 1.00 0.93 0.66 0.78
PerFlow(Avg) 0.64 0.88 0.61 0.87 0.59 0.86 0.71 0.88 0.55 0.85 0.52 0.80 0.68 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.63 0.87
51
A.2.2.2 Active Analysis
Table 21: Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.43 0.97 0.64 0.97 0.54 0.97
DevAS2 0.66 0.95 0.81 0.99 0.73 0.97
DevAS3 0.38 0.95 0.55 0.95 0.46 0.95
DevAS4 0.48 0.95 0.38 0.95 0.43 0.95
DevAS5 0.40 0.96 0.37 0.96 0.38 0.96
DevC1 0.23 0.96 0.17 0.96 0.20 0.96
DevC2 0.47 0.97 0.70 0.97 0.59 0.97
DevP1 0.90 0.98 0.78 0.97 0.84 0.97
DevP2 0.01 0.94 0.15 0.96 0.08 0.95
DevG1 0.85 0.99 0.71 0.99 0.78 0.99
DevG2 0.54 0.97 0.72 0.98 0.63 0.98
DevL1 0.34 0.95 0.54 0.96 0.44 0.96
DevL2 0.77 0.98 0.60 0.98 0.69 0.98
DevH1 0.63 0.95 0.79 0.99 0.71 0.97
DevH2 0.05 0.96 0.74 0.98 0.39 0.97
DevA1 0.72 0.96 0.30 0.97 0.51 0.96
DevA2 0.42 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.70 0.98
DevT1 0.53 0.95 0.17 0.92 0.35 0.93
DevT2 0.28 0.94 0.42 0.95 0.35 0.94
DevK1 0.72 0.98 0.92 1.00 0.82 0.99
DevK2 0.93 0.99 0.78 0.99 0.85 0.99
Unknown 0.45 0.81 0.57 0.81 0.51 0.81
PerFlow(Avg) 0.51 0.96 0.58 0.96 0.55 0.96
Table 22: Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wireless Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.83 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.84 0.97
Camera 0.41 0.93 0.71 0.96 0.56 0.94
Gaming 0.83 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.89 0.99
GooglePhone 0.71 0.97 0.72 0.96 0.72 0.97
Laptop 0.54 0.93 0.57 0.89 0.56 0.91
Printer 0.97 1.00 0.85 0.98 0.91 0.99
TV 0.17 0.90 0.17 0.90 0.17 0.90
Tablet 0.98 0.96 0.85 0.97 0.91 0.96
eReader 0.81 0.98 0.69 0.96 0.75 0.97
Unknown 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.82 0.78 0.81
PerFlow(Avg) 0.70 0.94 0.71 0.94 0.71 0.94
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A.3 Results from Wired Campus Network Experiments
A.3.1 Known Analysis
A.3.1.1 Passive Fingerprinting
Table 23: Device ID - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.70 0.95 0.56 0.89 0.51 0.88 0.33 0.87 0.89 0.96 0.78 0.94 0.63 0.92
DevAS2 0.87 0.97 0.19 0.86 0.42 0.87 0.21 0.79 0.05 0.89 0.61 0.89 0.39 0.88
DevAS3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.43 0.86 0.16 0.89 0.50 0.88 0.48 0.82 0.59 0.91
DevAS4 0.76 0.92 0.51 0.92 0.44 0.87 0.11 0.85 0.67 0.84 0.09 0.85 0.43 0.88
DevAS5 0.54 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.24 0.85 0.33 0.74 0.27 0.85 0.31 0.90 0.43 0.86
DevD1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DevD2 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.93 0.20 0.85 0.59 0.91 0.75 0.95
DevL1 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.38 0.93 0.83 0.96 0.82 0.97
DevL2 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.75 0.96 0.62 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.65 0.92 0.81 0.95
PerFlow(Avg) 0.86 0.97 0.78 0.95 0.63 0.92 0.50 0.89 0.55 0.90 0.59 0.91 0.65 0.92
Table 24: Device Type - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.79 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.88
Dell 0.39 0.76 0.27 0.72 0.60 0.87 0.29 0.72 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.56 0.26 0.69
Laptop 0.87 0.76 0.89 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.83 0.45 0.69 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.80
PerFlow(Avg) 0.75 0.84 0.72 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.72 0.81 0.49 0.66 0.56 0.71 0.68 0.79
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A.3.1.2 Active Fingerprinting
Table 25: Device ID - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.53 0.93 0.38 0.93 0.46 0.93
DevAS2 0.42 0.94 0.34 0.91 0.38 0.92
DevAS3 0.49 0.93 0.94 0.98 0.72 0.95
DevAS4 0.68 0.95 0.27 0.92 0.47 0.93
DevAS5 0.22 0.94 0.20 0.93 0.21 0.93
DevC1 0.97 0.96 0.41 0.92 0.69 0.94
DevC2 0.34 0.96 0.16 0.91 0.25 0.94
DevD1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DevD2 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.98 1.00
DevP1 0.34 0.96 0.84 0.99 0.59 0.97
DevP2 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97
DevL1 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99
DevL2 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.98 0.86 0.99
DevH1 0.98 0.94 0.81 0.97 0.89 0.95
DevH2 0.01 0.94 0.61 0.96 0.31 0.95
DevA1 0.34 0.96 0.83 0.99 0.58 0.97
DevA2 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.99 0.93 0.97
PerFlow(Avg) 0.66 0.96 0.67 0.96 0.66 0.96
Table 26: Device Type - Known Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.96
Camera 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.95
Dell 0.13 0.87 0.03 0.86 0.08 0.87
Gaming 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Laptop 1.00 0.99 0.70 0.96 0.85 0.97
Printer 0.99 0.94 1.00 0.95 1.00 0.94
TV 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00




Table 27: Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.37 0.92 0.55 0.93 0.50 0.90 0.26 0.89 0.52 0.95 0.80 0.96 0.50 0.92
DevAS2 0.63 0.94 0.18 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.17 0.80 0.00 0.90 0.78 0.94 0.35 0.89
DevAS3 0.91 0.99 0.90 0.99 0.30 0.88 0.03 0.90 0.80 0.93 0.73 0.87 0.61 0.93
DevAS4 0.61 0.92 0.25 0.90 0.41 0.88 0.06 0.88 0.60 0.86 0.07 0.88 0.33 0.89
DevAS5 0.53 0.89 0.80 0.94 0.28 0.86 0.24 0.77 0.26 0.87 0.25 0.91 0.39 0.87
DevD1 0.90 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.92 0.99 0.77 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.88 0.99
DevD2 0.91 0.99 0.79 0.98 0.89 0.99 0.53 0.93 0.04 0.85 0.56 0.93 0.62 0.94
DevL1 0.86 0.98 0.79 0.98 0.74 0.95 0.86 0.99 0.25 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.73 0.97
DevL2 0.77 0.98 0.90 0.99 0.58 0.95 0.65 0.95 0.89 0.90 0.66 0.95 0.74 0.95
Unknown 0.74 0.85 0.77 0.81 0.50 0.81 0.49 0.75 0.47 0.75 0.54 0.84 0.58 0.80
PerFlow(Avg) 0.72 0.94 0.68 0.94 0.55 0.91 0.42 0.88 0.46 0.89 0.62 0.92 0.58 0.92
Table 28: Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Passive)
Ping C1 Ping C2 Tcp C1 Udp C1 UdpC3 Udp C4 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.76 0.93 0.77 0.95 0.90 0.98 0.89 0.97 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.96 0.84 0.94
Dell 0.27 0.71 0.30 0.78 0.80 0.96 0.52 0.84 0.22 0.68 0.40 0.77 0.42 0.79
Laptop 0.80 0.79 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.98 0.75 0.88 0.46 0.83 0.82 0.88 0.76 0.87
Unknown 0.37 0.64 0.68 0.73 1.00 0.91 0.80 0.79 0.49 0.63 0.65 0.75 0.66 0.74
PerFlow(Avg) 0.55 0.76 0.65 0.83 0.90 0.96 0.74 0.87 0.51 0.75 0.68 0.84 0.67 0.84
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A.3.2.2 Active Fingerprinting
Table 29: Device ID - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
DevAS1 0.55 0.94 0.24 0.93 0.39 0.93
DevAS2 0.24 0.94 0.22 0.91 0.23 0.93
DevAS3 0.29 0.93 0.79 0.97 0.54 0.95
DevAS4 0.80 0.98 0.18 0.93 0.49 0.95
DevAS5 0.58 0.94 0.32 0.93 0.45 0.94
DevC1 0.75 0.96 0.39 0.92 0.57 0.94
DevC2 0.03 0.95 0.22 0.93 0.13 0.94
DevD1 0.00 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.49 0.97
DevD2 0.87 0.99 0.85 0.99 0.86 0.99
DevP1 0.25 0.96 0.87 0.99 0.56 0.98
DevP2 0.92 0.96 0.89 0.99 0.91 0.97
DevL1 0.48 0.97 0.91 0.99 0.69 0.98
DevL2 0.53 0.92 0.69 0.97 0.61 0.94
DevH1 0.76 0.96 0.65 0.97 0.71 0.97
DevH2 0.08 0.95 0.70 0.97 0.39 0.96
DevA1 0.30 0.95 0.69 0.98 0.50 0.97
DevA2 0.85 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.85 0.97
Unknown 0.46 0.77 0.55 0.86 0.51 0.82
PerFlow(Avg) 0.49 0.94 0.61 0.96 0.55 0.95
Table 30: Device Type - Unknown Analysis on Wired Campus Network (Active)
Ping C1 Ping C2 PerDevice(Avg)
γ α γ α γ α
AsusNetbook 0.90 0.99 0.83 0.94 0.86 0.96
Camera 0.74 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.84 0.98
Dell 0.00 0.86 0.10 0.89 0.05 0.87
Gaming 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.98 0.93 0.99
Laptop 0.86 0.95 0.64 0.95 0.75 0.95
Printer 0.76 0.92 0.92 0.99 0.84 0.95
TV 0.92 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.90 0.99
Unknown 0.80 0.82 0.93 0.80 0.86 0.81
PerFlow(Avg) 0.75 0.94 0.77 0.94 0.76 0.94
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